In that regard, I observe that, at the abovementioned paragraphs of LBG’s statement in intervention at first instance, LBG sought, in essence, to take issue with the Commission, first, for having chosen, in its counterfactual analysis, a hypothesis – namely, a MasterCard system operating without MIF but with a rule prohibiting ex post pricing – having the same impact on competition between acquiring banks as the MIF (paragraphs 49 and 50), second, for having relied on the 2004 market study, the probative value of which is called into question (paragraph 51) and, third, for having adopted an ‘unusual’ approach by examining the restrictive effects of the MIF on the acquiring market and not on the issuing market, where the collusive arrangement was put in place (paragraphs 52 to 54).
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